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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN TANGARO, d.b.a TANGARO
LOAN AND JEWELRY,
Plaintiff-Appellant_,
vs.
AUGUSTINE LOPEZ MARRERO,
JACINTO RENEEN (RIVERA)
and E'T ANGELINE LOPEZ,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case
No. 9603

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This was an action to recover the balance of $1,083.50
claimed by plaintiffs remaining unpaid on a promissory
note executed on April 26, 1957 by the defendants
Augustine Lopez Marreo and his wife, Evangeline
Lopez, in favor of the plaintiff. 'fhe defendant, Jacinto
Rivera, was a co-signer and received no benefits therefrom. The note provided for payments at the rate of
$50.00 on each payday of Marrero, which came every
1
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two weeks. Marrero was employed by Kennecott Copper Corporation at· Bingham Canyon, Utah, and at
the time of the execution of the note worked five days
each week. Payments were made regularly in the sum
of $50.00 until March, 1958, at \vhich time the \vorking
week at Kennecott was reduced to 4 days, thereby materially lowering the income of defendant Marrero. By
mutual agreement bet\veen plaintiff and Marrero, the
instalments on the note were reduced to $25 per pay
day at said time. 'l,hese reduced payments were made
when due by lVIarrero until April, 1959, at which time
he filed a petition for bankruptcy in the U. S. District
Court. On the date of said filing there was a balance
owing on said note of $1,083.50, according to the testimony of the plaintiff, to which had been added the sum
of $156.60 interest to cover the extended period resulting from the decreased payments. Demand ""as then
made by plaintiff on the defendant co-signer, Jacinto
Rivera, for the same, and upon his failure to respond,
court action was commenced for its collection.
At the trial and in his pleadings, the defendant
Rivera presented three defenses, to-wit:
1. That the note had been paid in full.

2. That the reduction of the instalment payments
on the note by plaintiff 'vithout his consent or knowledge relieved him, as co-signer, from liability.
3. That usurious interest had been charged by plain-

tiff and that all interest should therefore be cancelled.
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'fhe Court heard th case without a jury and found
in favor of defendant on the first defense listed above,
holding that the note had. been paid in full by ~Iarrero
and his wife, and finding No Cause of Action against
defendant, Rivera. The Court withheld its decision of
Points 2 and 3. Plaintiff then presented a motion for
a new trial which was denied.

THE EVIDENCE
The undisputed evidence at the trial relating to the
payment of the note was presented by defendants
l\Iarrero and his wife, Evangeline, who had been discharged in bankruptcy. They testified that during Decetnber, 1958, they purchased some jewelry from plaintiff and borrowed from him Christmas money in the sum
of $150.00. At that time it was agreed that the cost of
the jewelry together with the $150.00 should be added
to the balance owing on the old note, which Rivera had
co-signed and that a new note should be excuted by
Marrero and his wife without a co-signer and the old
note returned to Marrero. Marrero and his wife then
both signed in blank a note which was provided by
plaintiff with the understanding that plaintiff would
complete it and that the old note would then be returned to ~Iarrero as soon as the full amount of the
new note could be determined by plaintiff.
On this point, Marrero testified as follows: Tr.

P. 33, L. 18.
3
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"Q., So he said the new note was to be what?

- A. The new note and the $150 and he have to
~figure how much the necklaces and put· it
with the $150 and how much I owe on the
old note, and he said the old note would be
paid ·after he made the new one, and_he give
me the new note for me and my wife to sign,
in blank, and he say after Christmas he figure
how much the necklace and the $150 and
how much money I got in the old note, and
put it together and give me the old note paid
off.
THE COURT: Say that again.
THE ·WITNESS: lie say that after Christmas he figure how much the necklace and the
$150 and how much I owe on the old note, put
it together, and give me the paid off-the old
n~~
.
. Q. Did he say what he was going to do with
the old note?

A. He said the old note would be all paid and he
give it to me.
Q. What 'vould he do?

A. He said he give it to me after Christmas because he be busy. I told him "That's all right.''
THE COURT: Did you sign the new note?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
TliE COURT: Who else signed it?
THE WITNESS: My wife.
THE COURT: 'Vhat did the new note sav,
when you signed it?
·
4
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'fHE WITNESS: He say in blank, Sir-he
say he going to fix him up after figure up
after Christmas.
'fHE COURT: Thank you. That is all.
Q.

(~lr.

Maw) Was anything said about Mr.
Rivero signing the note?

A. No, sir. He say my wife and I just on the
new note, because I been pay my payments
straight.
Q. Did you ask him anything concerning anyone
else signing?

A. Yes. I told him I needed to bring Mr. Rivero
to sign the new note. He say "No," just me
and my wife would be enough.
Q. Then what did you do with the note that you
signed in blank'?

A. I give it to him. He say he going to give me
the old one after Christmas."
(Tr. P. 35, L 4)

''Q. Did you ever mention it to him after Christmas?
A.

''rpayment
ell, after Christmas when I go to make
I asked for old note.

Q. What did he say?

A. He say he have no time to fix it, he say maybe
the next pay day."
Mr. Marrero continued by stating that he asked
for the old note on three different occasions and was
finally told by plaintiff that he had torn the note to
pieces and thrown it away.
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. Mr. Marrero repeated the same account in crossexamination. See Tr. pages 37 to 53.
Mrs. Evangeline Lopez's account of the making
of the new note jn payment of the old one is found in
Tr. P. 57 and 58.
Though the plaintiff testified in direct examination,
in cross examination and in rebuttal, he at no time denied
that a new note had been given in payment of the old
one_, nor did he refute the testimony of Marrero or his
wife regarding the same. Consequently the undisputed
testimony shows clearly that the note sued upon had
been paid in full by the substitution of a new note.

ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST POINT
In answer to plaintiff's first point in his brief that
the Court erred in its finding that the new note had
replaced the old one, it seems clear that there was no
evidence upon which the Court could have arrived at
any other conclusion. If there had been no new note,
certainly the plaintiff would have denied it. The fact
that there was no denial of the several pages of testimony of Marrero and his wife concerning the new note
as a substitute for the old one co11firms the truthfulness of testimony of Marrero and his wife. Certainly
their testimony cannot be brushed off, as plaintiff attempts to do in his brief, 'vith a statement that "The
testimony of Marrero, regarding a new note, does
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not make sense." As a matter of fact, it makes good
sense. ~Iarrero had never missed a payment on his note.
he had reduced the principal to less than one-half of
the original amount of the note. He borrowed money
from plaintiff in lesser amounts on several occasions
and had paid his debts in full. It is natural that plaintiff
,v·ould consider him as being a good risk without a cosigner now that the note had been reduced so greatly.
This coupled "·ith the fact that Marrero was permanently employed at Kennecott and was able to make his
regular payments gave plaintiff plenty of reason for
not insisting on a co-signer.

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND POINT
Plaintiff's second point that the Court was arbitrary in refusing to permit the plaintiff to reopen his
case to offer additional testimony seems untenable on
its face.
The transcript shows that after the case had been
closed and submitted on the evidence, the Court asked
the following:
Tr. P. 82, L. 3.
"l\Ir. Duncan, was there any testimony from
the plaintiff concerning the renewal note?
~IR.

DUNCAN: I think that the plaintiff denied that.

THE· COURT: I do not recall any testimony
on that.
7
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MR. DUNCAN: If there is any doubt about
. there not being a new note, I will move to
reopen.
THE COURT: Motion denied."
From the above it appears that there was no doubt
in the Court's mind that there was a new note so there
was no need of additional testimony to prove that there
was.
Certainly there is nothing in the above statements
which in any "\\ray indicate that the Court acted arbitrarily in refusing at that time "\\"hen both parties had
rested and submitted their cases, to permit the plaintiff
to do that which he had had ample opportunities to do
during the trial, but had deemed it undesirable to do,
namely introduce evidence either in support or opposition of the evidence presented by defendant.

CASES IN POINT
The major issue before the court, which covers both
of the point discussed in plaintiff's brief, relates to the
proposition of whether the trial court, sitting without
a jury, erred in denying plaintiff's motion for a new
trial.
This court has repeatedly held that it will not disturb the de~ision of the trial court in granting or denying a new trial if there is substantial evidence to support
its action, even though the evidence on material issues
might be highly conflicting.
8
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1\s early as the year 1881 this Court, in the case
of .~.\Tc7.cfon vs. Brown., 2 Utah 126, stated the law as
follows:

''When the motion for a new trial is founded
upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict and judgment, a large discretion is
vested in the court below, in refusing or granting
the motion. It must plainly appear that this discretion has been abused before the Appellate
Court will interfere with this action in granting
the motion on this ground.''
Shortly afterwards the Court, in the case of
Davis vs. Utah Southern R.R. Co .., 3 Utah 218, wherein a jury had awarded judgment to the plaintiff, a
similar statement of the law was made. In that case
the defendant had moved for a new trial and its motion
was granted by the trial court, whereupon the plaintiff
appealed.
This Court stated the law in that case as follows:
"The appellant's proof of negligence was very
meager and unsatisfactory, and was met by proof
quite as strong, if not more convincing, of the
entire absence of any negligence, unskillful, or
reckless management of the respondent's engine
on the occasion referred to. To say the least, the
evidence on this point was conflicting. Where
there is a substantial conflict of evidence on a
material point, this court "''"ill not reverse the
discretion exercised by the District Court in
granting a new trial."
From the dates of these early decisions this Court
has consistently affirmed the actions of trial courts in
9
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granting or denying motions for new trials whenever
there was evidence in the record in support of its findings. This rule was followed in the following cases:
Utah State National Bank vs. Livingston~ 69 Utah
284-154, P. 281; and James vs. Robertson, 117 P. 1068,
whe~ein Justice Frick wrote on page 1073:
"In a case where the question is whether the
defendant was guilty of negligence or not, the
·plaintiff need, however, merely to show a state
of facts from which the jury may logically infer
negligence; and if the jury believe plaintiff's
evidence from which the inference of negligence
may be deducted it may be, and ordinarily is,
sufficient to sustain a :finding of negligence; and
this is so, even if defendant disputes all of plaintiff's· evidence, or produces evidence from which
the jury might find that the injury complained
of was due to a cause or causes for which the
defendant was not responsible."
Justice W oolfe quoted from James vs. Robertson,
supra, as follows in the case of King vs. Union Pacific
R.R. Co.~ 212 P.2nd 692, on P. 694-95:
"In cases like the one before us where all other
assignments fail, and the only available assignment is that the evidence does not justify the
verdict of the jury, and where the trial court
has refused to grant a new trial, all that we are
authorized to do is look into the evidence to ascertain whether there is any substantial evidence
in support of every material element which
plaintiff is required to establish in order to recover. If there is such evidence, then so far as we
are concerned, the verdict must stand, although
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in our judgment, if 've passed on the facts, the
verdict on the 'vhole evidence should have been
to the contrary. Nor can we under the guise of
revie,ving an abuse of discretion by the trial
court in refusing to grant a new trial upon the
ground that the verdict is not supported by the
evidence, pass upon the weight of the evidence.
'vhat the district judge might or even should
have done in this regard we may not do for him,
simply because he refused to do it."
Referring to the case of Belford vs. Allen (Okla.)
80 P2nd 676, Justice Woolfe continued:
"The court held that where the evidence is conflicting the trial judge has the duty to weigh the
evidence and to approve or disapprove the verdict, and if the verdict is such that in the opinion
of the trial court, it should not be permitted to
stand and it is such that he cannot conscientiously
approve it and besides it should be for the opposite party, it is his duty to set it aside for a new
trial.''
From the above decisions as well as from numerous
others rendered by this Court, it seems clear that the
rule is 'veil established that the trial court has a wide
discretion in the matter of deciding whether a motion
for a new trial should be granted or denied; that it is
the trial court 'vhich has the responsibility of weighing
the evidence and of approving or disapproving the
verdict; and that the appellate court will sustain its
action on appeal if the record discloses substantial evidence in support of the conclusion that has been reached
by the trial court.
11
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A review of the evidence in the instant case reveals
that all of the evidence on the issue as to whether the
old note was paid by a new one was in the affirmative.
In fact, though the plaintiff testified on two occasions
during the trial-one during direct examination and
the other in rebuttal-he presented no evidence to the
contrary and did not deny any of the testimony presented by defendant on that issue. Nothing has been
pointed out in plaintiff's brief which indicates in any
way that the trial court's decision was not supported
by substantial evidence in the record that the note sued
upon had been paid. There is no conflicting evidence
on the point at issue upon which the trial court rendered
its decision for all of the testimony supports the decision of the court.
The charge of the plaintiff that the court acted
arbitrarily in refusing to grant his motion for a new
trial is related in no way to the evidence of the trial,
but is based on the refusal of the court to permit him
to reopen the case after it had been submitted, for the
purpose of doing what he had had numerous opportunities during the trial to do, namely present evidence
regarding the new note. Such a refusal by the trial
court was proper.
C.ONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits to the court that
before plaintiff could prevail in his appeal herein, he
must establish from the record that the decision of the
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trial court in finding for the plaintiff and in denying
plaintiff's motion for a new trial was unsupported by
substantial evidel}ce; and also that the weight of the
evidence in the record was contrary to the court's decision. This he has not done and could not do, for there
was no testimony to support such a claim.

HERBERT B. MAW
Attorney for Respondent
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